§0 Introduction

On a reductivist conception of intentions, an intention to do an action or a plan A is reducible to a predominant desire to A, to the belief that one will A or to the judgment that A is the best thing to do or even to some combination of these states\(^1\). Against these views, non-reduccionist about intentions have argued that decisions and intentions move us a step beyond the simple possession of desires, beliefs and judgments because I can have any combination of these states without having the intention to A. Even if I am predominantly motivated to do something, I may still not have formed an intention. « I might still be disposed to deliberate about what to do; for I might still not see the issue as settled. » (Bratman 1987 : 19). Hence, having an intention is something different and irreducible to a combination of desires and beliefs. Moreover, it has been argued that « my intention involves a special commitment to action that ordinary desires do not » since intentions are « conduct-controlling pro-attitudes » whereas ordinary desires are « merely potential influencers of action » (Bratman 1987 : 16). Finally, the realization of our desires supposes that we have capacities to control our actions. This requires at the lowest level that we have motor representations that produce and control our most basic actions (Searle 1983, Mele 1992, Pacherie 2003). In the same vein but at a higher level, the intention to realize a plan seems to play a similar role in the initiation, the control and the coordination of the actions that are parts of this plan. Thus, most philosophers agree now that intentions are irreducible mental states. One distinguishes though two categories of intentions depending on the type of representationnal content and conscious control. On one hand, prior intentions and present intentions are fully conscious ; they are formed before acting or just before and are responsible for the conscious guidance and control of our actions at the level of plans or of action types. On the other hand, the motor intentions guide and control our movements or basic actions, while these control and guidance are largely unconscious. Both prior, present and motor intentions have nevertheless several functions or dimensions : before acting, they constrain and trigger our practical reasoning because it is irrational to have incompatible intentions and because our intentions need to be specified in order to be completed ; their motivational dimension is to trigger and to sustain our actions ; finally, their monitoring function is to guide our actions and to control them.

In this paper, I focus on the relation between the motivational dimension of an intention and the motivations that contributed to the production of that very intention. Most philosophers will certainly agree that the motivational dimension of an intention is largely inherited from the desires and the other motivations that were reasons to form this intention. It leaves us nevertheless with the question of the ontological dependence : is the motivational dimension of an intention to A ontologically independent of our motivations to A or is it partly or even fully constituted by or relying on our motivations to A ? In the first section, I will present the various possible accounts of this relation and I will defend that the motivational dimension of an intention to A is constituted by our motivations to A. But if this first point is correct, then it raises a challenge for the non-reduccionist that I will display in the second section : if intentions are partly constituted by motivating states, how the non-reduccionist is going to be able to tell us that

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\(^1\) More or less sophisticated versions of this idea appears in Audi (1973), Davidson (1978), Davis (1984), Grice (1971), Hampshire and Hart (1958), Harman (1976), Velleman (1985).

\(^2\) Certainly, the works of Bratman (1987, 1999, 2008) have been decisive. Versions of non-reductionnism have been proposed also by Searle (1983), Brandt (1984), Mele (1992, 2003) and Pacherie (2003, 2006).
whatever is added to a set of motivations, this very whole is not reducible to a set of motivating states plus what has been added to them. It is important to notice that it will neither be sufficient for the non-reductivist to say that no belief added to our predominant motivation can account for the properties of intentions nor be sufficient to say that some other constituents of intentions are themselves irreducible. In fact, I will try to show that no answer to this challenge is available since a reductive account is available once a correct analysis is given of the state of being decided and the role of plans in guiding and controlling the realization of our plans.

§1 The Motivational Dimension of Intentions
Before considering the motivational dimension of intentions, and since not all philosophers agree that our desires are the only motivating states if we except intentions, let me say that I will use the term motivation to encompass both our desires and any other states, beliefs or judgments, that may have an intrinsic motivational power. Presented within this vocabulary, our present problem is to understand the ontological relation between the motivational dimension of our intentions and our motivations.

This topic is usually brought to the surface when one considers two phenomenologically salient characteristics of prior intentions: their stability and their inertia. When one has the prior intention to A, it seems that the question of whether one is going to A or not is somehow settled. No doubt, that intention may be reconsidered, but in saying that we have an intention, we are not simply saying something about our preferences now. Thus, it seems that our intentions are more stable than our preferences. They are more stable because it would be irrational to be in the permanent process of reconsidering them and because even if our reconsideration policy may be more or less rational, we are rarely irrational to the point of permanently reconsidering them. Thus, our intentions have a kind of inertia. Moreover, this inertia is confirmed by the intuition that we are more apt to resist temptation when we have previously formed an intention against temptation.

These acknowledged features of intentions may conduce to very different conceptions of intentions, and especially of their rational formation and reconsideration. Sobel argues for the extrem view to the effect that a «resolute agent» can «tie her hand» so that by forming an intention she can make necessary and inevitable some action» (Sobel 1994: 4.2). Gauthier’s account (Gauthier 1994, «Assure and threaten»; «Commitment and choice: An Essay on the Rationlity of Plans», in Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behavior, d. Farina, Hahn, vannucci. OUP 1996, «Intention and Deliberation» in Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rational and Moral Agents, pp. 40-53) is less strong but still asserts that a rational agent is able to adopt cooperative plans that will drive her to cooperate although it will no longer be in her interest to do so at that time. Bratman’s view is still weaker. On his view, such ties that «can trump temporal and causal location» do not exist since «what is up to the agent is what to do from now on.» (Bratman 1999: 72). Nevertheless, Bratman argues that «an instrumental rational planner will have mechanisms and strategies of reconsideration that sometimes block reconsiderations of a prior intention in the face of merely temporary preference change.» (Bratman 1995: 304). But the weakest view is offered by Mele who argues on one hand that one can acquire an intention against our predominant motivations because such intentions acquisition often result from an evaluative judgment that may not be in line with our predominant motivation. But on the other hand he accepts that «a necessary condition of the acquisition of a proximal intention’s having an appropriate triggering effect is that its having such an effect is compatible with the agent’s motivational state at the time» (Mele 1992:179). The tension between this two assertions brings him to assert that one can act on an intention that is not in line with our predominant motivations only in two very specific type of cases: on the first, an intention can trigger the initiation of the corresponding action but this will not be sufficient to complete the action (Mele 1992: 188). On the second, once someone has started to realize an intention that is in line with her predominant motivations, she may achieve this action although her predominant motivation has changed (Mele
2003 : 171). On this last view, we cannot deny that our intentions still have some inertia but its importance is close to nothing\(^3\).

Beyond the large spectrum of these views, we should notice that on all of these accounts, their are circumstances in which one may act on an intention that is not in line with our predominant motivations. How can these theories give an account of the phenomenon? The simplest answer is certainly that the motivational dimension of our intentions is ontologically independent of our motivations. Such a view would fully explain the inertia of our intentions and it is clearly adopted by Bratman who tells us that « prior intentions and plans can have an independent role in rational motivation: once in place they can sometimes rationally control conduct even if the face of a temporary preference change to the contrary. » (Bratman 1995 :304).

The clearest statement on this question comes from Mele who writes : « It may normally happen that desires to A play a causal role in the production of intentions to A and that the desires persist at least as long as the intentions do. When this happens, the agent who intends to A does desire or want to A, even if the intention does not have the desire or want as a constituent. » (Mele 2003 : 171)

Although this conception of the motivational dimension is simple, and goes with the intuitive idea that once our motivations are transmitted to our intentions, they can produce action without relying anymore on our intentions, this complete ontological independence is not very plausible. First notice that if it were true, then the argument raised by Bratman against Gauthier’s view and any robust theory of intentions is seriously weakened. Their is a clear conflict between a defense of the motivational autonomy of our intentions and the idea that « what is up to the agent is what to do from now on. » (Bratman 1998 : 73). If reconsideration is always possible and if it brings us to revise our intentions if we have different motivations, than it is hard to see in what sense our intentions can bring us to act against our predominant motivation. Well aware of that difficulty, Bratman’s view escape this objection since he argues that when someone acts on an intention against her predominant motivations, it is because she is not aware of this reversal or because she resists to reconsider her intention in light of the evolution of her motivations. The autonomy of the motivational dimension of an intention is then weaker since it is able to trigger and sustain an action only if the agent has not reconsidered her intention. However, even if limited in scope, this autonomy of the motivational dimension of intentions does not seem to fit the facts.

Let suppose for the sake of the argument that the motivational dimension of intentions is ontologically autonomous. Thus, if I formed yesterday the intention to A, and if my motivations have changed, then, provided I do not reconsider my intention, I will act on the motivations to A that I had yesterday and that have been transmitted to my intention. But this seems plainly wrong. Imagine that I thought yesterday that it would be a great idea to cycle to my office. Enthusiastic about this idea, I decided to do it. But this morning, I do not feel anymore enthusiastic. Suppose nevertheless, that I go on to cycle to my office without reconsidering my intention. I may pick my bicycle without any enthusiasm; the way can be especially hard going because of my lack of enthusiasm and I may moan all the way long. Now, we may ask: what motivated me today to cycle to my office today? On the autonomous view, I am motivated by the motivational dimension of the intention that I formed yesterday. But this is the wrong answer. If my past motivation somehow maintained in the motivational dimension of the F-intention was responsible of my acting today, then I would surely act with more enthusiasm. At least, the motivation that sustain my cycling today would be much stronger and this would make a difference in the energy that I put in the activity and hence in the style of my cycling. It would even make a difference in the pleasure or displeasure that I took in cycling.

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\(^3\) In fact, the ability that allows us on the view of Mele to resist our stronger motivations and exert self-control does not proceed from our intention but from our capacity to act to reverse our predominant motivations.
This argument converges also with what is known about the neurological underpinning of the psychological states that cause our actions. Especially relevant for us here is the fact that the prefrontal cortex that is considered as responsible for the planning and the control of our actions (cf. for instance Badre 2008, TICS) is nevertheless unable to elicit voluntary actions: «Contrary to common belief (...) the cortical areas including the ‘executive’ pre-frontal cortex, alone are not able to elicit voluntary actions.» (Roth 2003 : 120) and to raise the symmetric readiness potential which appears 1 or 2 seconds before action to a sufficient threshold to trigger an action. Actions can only be triggered if they pass the «basal ganglia censorship» that evaluate the intended action to our previous experiences, our goals, emotional memory, etc. In other words, it seems that our plans are not simply applied but are constantly evaluated relatively to our motivations whenever there is or not an explicit reconsideration of our intention, and this means that even if we follow a plan, the realisation of this plan is under the control of our motivations.¹

But does the objections that we just raised against the ontological autonomy of the motivational dimension of prior intentions applies also to motor-intentions? As we saw earlier, motor intentions trigger and sustain our actions during their realization. As such, they clearly play a causal role in the production of our actions. In this sense at least, one can say that they motivate our actions since they not only represent these actions but also produce them. However, does this implies that their motivational power is independent from our desires? Lets look first at the initiating function. Since motor intentions are formed a few hundred milliseconds before we act or at the time of acting, one can hardly say that they are responsible for the initiation of action. One should say instead that the real initiator of our acting is what produces a motor intention, that is either a antecedent motivation or a prior intentions. The upshot is that even if motor intentions are the very proximal causes of our actions, they are certainly not the initiators of our actions.

But defenders of the motivational independence of our P-intentions may resist on the count that even if motor intention do not trigger our actions, they at least sustain our action and produce a collateral control that evaluates the side-effects of accomplishing an action (Pacherie 2006 : 6 et ref à Buekens et al. 2001). All this is certainly true, but this evaluation is certainly relative to our goals, our past experience, etc. Hence, if the activation of a motor intentions implies an evaluation of the possible result of that intention, the motivational consequences of this evaluation clearly depends on our motivations. Thus, here again, the sustaining function of our motor representation is constituted by our motivations.

To summarize, it appears that both prior and motor intentions are not fridges for our motivations. It might have been a good thing if intentions were to allow us such a conservative operation, but the fact is simply that we are not built that way: the realization of our intentions do not rely on the desires that we had yesterday but only of those that we have at the time of acting.

However, it seems that this leaves us with a problem: how are we to account for the inertia of at least our prior intentions if we acknowledge that the motivational dimension of our intentions is constituted by our motivations? In fact, there are plentiful available response. First, one can argue that by deciding, we have produced a supplementary motivation since if we do not act as we have decided then it would have now a cost: we would have to think of ourselves as

¹ I can certainly not take these considerations as definitive since a defender of the autonomy of the motivational dimension of intention can argue that this dimension is somehow memorized in the basal ganglia. But if the loops that link the cortex and the basal ganglia have precisely the function of adapting our plans to our motivation and our context, it seems that the case for the defender of the autonomy thesis is weakened.

² Notice however that this «conjecture» as Bratman himself calls it (Bratman 1995 : 304) is itself far from obvious. For instance, it would be completely inappropriate to realize a dangerous act that we decided yesterday if we lack confidence and feel moody today. More generally, we may find plentiful arguments showing that weakness of the will is beneficial from an evolutionary perspectives (cf. for instance …).
someone who is not able to stick to his decisions. This effect is very clear if I announce to my colleague that I’m going to finish this paper this summer, but it is still present even if I am the only witness of this decision. Such an effect may even appear if an intention is not formed through a decision.

Second, if one form an intention before the time has come to act, it implies that in most cases there is an advantage in being settled in advance. But, if one then renounce to act on this intentions, then it implies that we loose this benefit since it is as if we are just deciding to act now. Moreover, because it is often costly to fully reconsider if a plan is still rational, it is often more rational to choose to act as we intended than to reconsider our intention in order to find if one would be more motivated by another plan.

Finally, to hold to an intention until the time to act comes often implies the renouncement to other line of conduct. It may even imply a kind of investment since one tends to identify oneself with our intentions. Hence, to hold to an intention until its completion implies a cost that has not yet produced any benefit. Thus, there isn’t any reason that the well-known phenomenon of ‘sunk cost’ and ‘escalating commitment’ may not apply. It has been consistently shown that there is a tendency to commit more effort and resources into a course of action that has already been costly whereas it would be more rational to discontinue this unproductive line of behavior.

The inertia of intentions that apparently allows us to act against our predominant motivation can be in fact fully explained as an effect of the formation of our intentions on our motivations, an effect that reinforces our motivations to act as we intended even if our original motivation is weakened. Thus, we can fully acknowledge that the motivational dimension of an intention to A is fully constituted by our motivations to A. If this assertion is correct, then two points follow. First, we have a very strong argument against any theory that argues that intentions allow us to act as if our motivations were not ‘temporally and causally located’. This is not an objection about possible rational agents, it is only the modest fact that we are not so constructed that such a form of rationality is reachable for us. The second point is a challenge for the non-reductivist about intentions: if an intention to A is partly constituted by our motivations to A, then whatever is added to make an intention, how the non-reductivist is going to escape the conclusion that an intention to A is reducible to motivation to A plus whatever has been added to constitute an intention?

§2 A Reductive Account: Being Decided
As I already mentioned, it will not be sufficient for the non-reductivist to remind us that reductions in terms of motivations and beliefs fail and I will not rehearse here the arguments against this strategy. At most, it shows that in order to be successful, a reductive account has to integrate other states or processes. Moreover, the introduction in the reductive account of mental states that are not themselves reducible will not prove that intentions themselves are not reducible. Hence, the fact that plans constitute a central element of intentions does not prove that intentions are irreducible even if plans are irreducible, a line of argument that seems often implicit in Bratman’s ‘planning theory of intentions’. This is not to say that the argument would not be correct if intentions were nothing else than plans, but this last view is clearly wrong since one can consider a plan, for instance how to get to one place, without having the intention to realize this plan, or even to get to this place. It may be only to advise someone else.

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6 Sobel (1994 : 4.4 et 4.5) for instance argues that an agent may through a decision put a bonus on the realization of her intention since it would realize the value of firmness or attach a penalty if one fail to realize the intended action.
7 The first studies to deal specifically with the process of escalating commitment have been conducted by Staw (1976). The explanation of the phenomenon is however hotly debated. See for instance Whyte (1986) for an alternative explanation.
8 These arguments may be found in Bratman, Pacherie…
I believe however that this challenge cannot be answered. The reason is simply that I do not see why we could not simply add to our motivations to A, in order to construct a reductivist account of intentions, all the interesting properties that non-reductivists accounts have unraveled as constituting an intention to A. The main idea of such a reductivist account would be that an intention to A is a motivation to A that we are decided to realize and that would control our realization to A. But, am I not cheating here for an opponent will say that being decided is precisely a sui-generis state of intention, and that only these sui-generis states of intending can control our actions. To calm these worries, I shall present and defend in more detail my proposal in the rest of the paper and argue therefore that it is a mistake to understand intentions as a sui generis state of mind.

Let us start with the state of being decided, a state that we may identify to an intention as long as one does not act on this intention. My own view is that being decided about a motivation to A is simply a further characterization of that very motivation. To justify this characterization, I will first analyze this state of being decided from a phenomenological point of view and then move on to a functional characterization of that state.

Before coming to this phenomenological analysis, we have to notice that an explicit decision is not required in order to be decided, a fact that is willingly agreed by non-reductivists. After days of hesitations, one can wake up a morning with the clear feeling that one is now decided. Interestingly, the contrary is also true. One may explicitly make a decision, even by saying oneself that our plan is now settled, without this producing any state of being decided.

Think for instance of an agent who is prone to compulsive verification behaviors and who tries to leave his house without coming back once again to check if the oven is turned off. Thus, being decided about a goal is not essentially linked to a mental act of decision. What we have to inquire is this state of being decided itself.

From a phenomenological point of view, this feeling is hard to describe but we may compare it with epistemic feelings. It is now fully acknowledged that such feelings exist and may play a metacognitive role in helping us for instance to identify that a name that we just retrieved is the name that we were looking for. It may also account in a similar fashion for the distinction between judging after a deliberative process that one should reasonably believe something and acquiring this belief, two things than can come apart just as our best evaluative judgment may come apart with the intention that we acquire. However, although I will not defend any specific view about what one may call 'practical feelings' in comparison with epistemic feelings, one may contrast this feeling of being decided with various psychological states. When I feel decided, I have no more or little hesitation about what to do; the feeling is altogether one of being sufficiently motivated to A and the experience that nothing holds me back. In other words, I have no strong inhibiting motivation that would prevent me to act or would require that I deliberate more to weaken this inhibition. Hence, it seems that the feeling of being decided to A is linked to— or may even be constituted by — a sufficient motivation to act and the absence of inhibitory processes or motivations that would prevent me to be disposed to act now in order to A.

Note that this analogy with theoretical deliberation is quite deep since they share several characteristics: when we stick to a belief against our judgment after deliberation, that belief is also such that it would be extremely hard not to act on it. Thus, the epistemic feeling is also linked to a disposition to act. A second shared characteristic is the passivity of the acquisition of beliefs and intentions. Even if we can deliberate about reason to believe or reason to act or to

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10 Bratman acknowledges that some intentions need not be deliberative and can be ‘spontaneous’ (1987: 57) and Mele makes it even more clear that « not all intentions are arrived at via decision” (1992: 141).

11 One may here be reluctant to call such an event a decision since a decision implies, in virtue of its signification itself, that one becomes decided through that decision. But this objection would only require that I reformulate my point by saying that one may do what one usually do to make an explicit decision without becoming decided. Thus the dispute would be purely verbal.
form an intention and even if such a deliberation may be voluntary, the acquisition of a belief and the acquisition of an intention, the fact of being decided are both something that happens to us.

From this phenomenological description of the experience of being decided, one may draw a functional definition of the state of being decided:

An agent is decided to A if and only if this agent is now predominantly motivated to A and if no inhibitory motivation or inhibitory process prevents now the agent to be disposed to act in order to A.

The important point is that the state of being decided is partly but not only a state of predominant motivation. As it has been clearly shown, there are several types of situations in which one has a predominant motivation without being decided. First, one may have various inhibitory motivations: for instance, one may be unable to realize the means required in order to reach a desired goal, or the probability of attaining the goal may be too low. In other cases, one may be unable to renounce yet to another goal that is too hard or impossible to reach\(^\text{12}\), which means that in fact, even if it is irrational, one is still predominantly motivated toward this other goal. However, it is not sure that we really have here true counter-examples since one may say that if we are not decided in such cases, we do neither have a predominant motivation. There is a second type of cases that is relevant; in these cases, one may have a predominant motivation although one would be prevented to act by the necessity of a more extensive deliberation about the possible consequences or side-effects of the realization of that motivation\(^\text{13}\), and it seems hard to deny that such consideration can prevent us to act on our predominant motivations. Thus, these cases justify the introduction of the clause about inhibitory processes. Moreover, the introduction of this clause allows us to answer to the objections that have been raised against reductive accounts in terms of predominant motivations.

My proposal is therefore that the state of being decided is a complex state; this state is characterized by a predominant motivation toward a plan that is not inhibited. It follows that to acquire such a state gets us further than the simple possession of predominant motivations and closer to action. Nevertheless, we do not come to know that we are in such a state through a kind of evaluation of our various motivations and through predictions about inhibitory process. As we know directly that we believe or not something, we know directly about practical matters that we hesitate or that we are decided. This explains why we are tempted to see our intentions, the state of being decided as a unique sui generis state. But this temptation should be resisted. The fact that this knowledge is direct does not imply necessarily that there is a unique sui generis state underlying this knowledge. That this knowledge is direct does not exclude that we are thereby aware of a disposition to act, while this disposition is constituted by the fact that we have a predominant and uninhibited motivation. Moreover, since an intention to A before acting is a state of being decided to A and since an intention to A encompasses our motivations to A, we have a serious reason to prefer a complex analysis of the state of being decided to A that encompasses as an element of the analysans our motivations to A.

Finally, I would like to put forward two interesting consequences about this reduction of the state of being decided. First, it is important to notice that when one is decided, this state is only related to our present motivations: being decided to A is not making any prediction about our future motivations. For instance, I can be decided to work this afternoon even if I know for nearly sure that I will not be motivated anymore this afternoon, and that I will just do nothing as I did all the past days. However, if I am decided now, I may act now in order to realize this plan or

\(^{12}\) Cf. for instance Mele 1992 : 142.

\(^{13}\) Our dispositions to be decided fit quite well with the following principle of practical rationality : even if one judges that an action is better than any other given all the relevant reasons now available, it may be irrational to act on such a judgement if one were to believe that the relevant set of available reasons is not adequate, if we have exclusionary reason to act on the set of reasons available. Cf. on this point Henden, (2006) who himself rely on Raz (1990) who distinguishes between first-order reasons that are reasons to act and second-order reasons : reasons that defeat our reason to act.
against other plans that would prevent me from realize this plan in the future. For instance, I may
decline an invitation to go to the movie and if I accept to go to the movie, then it would mean that
I am not decided anymore to work this afternoon.

Thus, this first remark brings a second one: our analysis of the state of being decided can
easily handle the fact that our intentions constitute rational constraints for other intentions. It is
not only clear that it is irrational to have two predominant and uninhibited motivations but this
will be effective in our practical deliberation since whenever we are decided upon a course of
action, we are disposed to reject any action or project that would be incompatible with this
project. Moreover, since being decided implies a disposition to act now, it will trigger reflection
in order to precise is necessary or when necessary our plan. The account of our intentions until we
are acting on them is thus able to account for the role of intentions in practical reasoning.

§3 A Reductive Account: Guidance and Control

It would however be inadequate to reduce an intention toward a plan A to the state of
being decided to A because it would miss the fact that an intention to A is able to produce, guide
and control the realization of A. In other words, if the formation of an intention is nothing else
than being decided on a plan, it is important to acknowledge also its other main role that consists
in triggering, guiding and controlling the realization of this plan. In fact, this ‘executive’
dimension of intentions has been a major argument for non-reductivists who have been tempted
to identify intentions to plans. Nevertheless, although this monitoring function of intentions is
central, it does not imply that our intentions are irreducible and that they should be identified with
plans.

As we have already noticed, one may simply think about a plan A without having an
intention to A. Hence, in order to have the intention to realize a plan A, one needs something
more which is precisely being decided upon this plan. Therefore, one can have an intention
toward a plan A and act to realize A only if one is decided to do this plan, i.e. if one is
predominantly motivated to A and if one is not inhibited to A. In other words, this means that one
can act to realize a plan A only if this plan is sustained by our motivations to A. Thus, our actions
are not guided and controlled by our plans alone. The guidance and control is a combined effect
of our plans and our motivations. This fact is well manifested by the various dimensions of
guidance and control because a large part of the guidance relies heavily on the motivational
constituents of our intentions. The choice of the specific means and specific movements that
realize our plans depends on the interaction of constraints that comes from our motivations and
our plans. Our motivations do not only favor some means over others but the strength of our
motivations will also have an influence on the selection of appropriate movements. The same
agent will perform differently the same action depending on whether he intensely desires or not a
given goal, on whether he is of two mind or not, etc. Moreover, the context, the proximity of the
goal and its possible effects will constantly be evaluated in relation to her motivations, and it will
determine if the plan is triggered, if it is sustained and how it will be realized. Thus, it is a
complete mistake to conceive of the motivational dimension of our intentions as something that
would be stable and partly independent from our motivations.

However, this is not to deny that our plans, whether they are abstract or consist of the
motor representations that guide our actions, constitute the representations that guide the
realization of our plans, and that they allow us to control the accuracy of our movements and at
the higher level that we are in effect realizing the steps of the plans that we explicitly settled.
(Figure 1 summarizes how these two types of control may be understood.) Moreover, nothing
prevents us to admit that the kind of guidance and control that is the proper function of plans
when they are sustained to realize our actions is irreducible. Hence, the outline of the reductive
account that I have presented earlier may now be fleshed out. Our central idea was that an
intention to A is a motivation to A that we are decided to realize and that will control our
realization to A if we are still decided. More precisely, my reductive account of intentions could now be stated as follows:

An agent S has an intention to realize a plan A if and only if S has now predominant uninhibited motivations to A

(i) that trigger or sustain this plan in guiding and monitoring A (for a motor or present intention), or

(ii) (for prior intentions)

(a) that trigger or sustain whatever is required now to allow the future realization of A in the future and,

(b) that will trigger and sustain this plan in guiding and monitoring A if S is still predominantly motivated and uninhibited to A.

To sum up, the starting point of our argument has been that non-reductive conceptions of intentions have neglected to give a full account of the motivational dimension of intentions, or have been mistaken about it. The main view seems to be that this motivational dimension of an intention to A is causally dependent but ontologically independent of our motivations to A. In favor of this independence, non-reductivists about intentions were tempted to believe that intentions imply strong commitments, and thus may allow us to act against even our strongest motivations. These views are however rebutted by the facts: our motivations to A do sustain our doing A, and moreover, there is no reason to consider that the stability of our intentions relies on anything else than our motivations.

But once this is acknowledged, the non-reductivist is confronted to a challenge: he has to explain us why an intention to A is not reducible to our motivations to A plus whatever is added to constitute an intention. My aim in the second part of the paper has not been to prove directly that such a challenge can or cannot be answered. Instead, I have presented a reductive account of intentions starting from the idea that an intention is nothing else than a plan about which one is so motivated that one is now disposed to do whatever is required to allow the realization of this plan or to realize it. Thus, it shows indirectly that the challenge cannot be answered. The key point has been however to insist that when one acts to realize a prior intention, our acting do not depend on past motivations but always on our present motivations that not only trigger and sustain our action through a constant evaluation of its realization and context, but also guide it through the selection of sub-plans and movements to specify our acts and their style.

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